



A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERALISM
JENNA BEDNAR*
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.**
Like the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence, its
federalism jurisprudence might, uncharitably, be described as "a
mess."' The Court's decisions setting forth jurisdictional limitations
on national power have waffled famously. Taken as a whole, they
flunk requirements of either good law or good policy: The decisions
are inconsistent with constitutional text and with one another, and
they lack a persuasive normative theory to justify the first inconsis-
tency or to resolve the second. These difficulties are rehearsed in the
six different opinions the Justices rendered in United States v. Lopez,
where a fractured Court invalidated a federal statute that made it a
crime to possess a firearm in proximity to a school.
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Earlier versions of this Article were presented in workshops at the law schools of Stanford
University and Washington University, and the last draft was presented at the conference organ-
ized by the California Institute of Technology and the University of Southern California Law
Center. We appreciate comments from participants in those workshops. We received particu-
larly detailed and usefully critical comments from William Cohen, Barbara Fried, Gerald Gun-
ther (our gracious commentator and presenter at the Stanford workshop), Mark Kelman, Ron
Levin, Bruce La Pierre, Margaret Radin, and Emerson Tiller (our gracious commentator at the
CIT-USC conference). John Ferejohn, widely known as the "high priest of rational choice," is
the intellectual parent of our work, and to him we are grateful for both comments and
inspiration.
1. Cf. Stephen Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARv. L. REV. 105 (1988).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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The Court's decisions enforcing a "dormant" commerce clause
against state regulations look worse on the law side (they do not even
have a constitutional text with which they might be consistent) but
better on the policy side (setting forth potentially attractive theories).
The Court's vigorous enforcement of limits on state governments is in
striking contrast to its virtual abandonment of limits on the national
government. Part I of this Article explores these and other analytical
problems with the Court's decisions under traditional rule of law
criteria.3
Constitutional analysis is rarely exhausted by mechanical applica-
tion of legal text and precedent. Hence, we are open to the possibility
that at least some of the Court's decisions can be justified or recon-
ciled by a political theory of federalism. This is an important en-
deavor, in part because federalism is so prominent in the Constitution,
and prominent by design. Constitutional law must make some sense
of federalism, an impulse reflected in each of the six Lopez opinions.
Although there will inevitably be uncertainties of application in par-
ticular cases, rule of law values such as predictability and security are
enhanced by a theory that makes federalism relatively intelligible or
coherent.4 Not least importantly, federalism has substantial advan-
tages for a polity, as we argue in Part II of this Article.
Justice O'Connor's important opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft5
sets forth two theories of federalism and suggests the basis for a third.
We elaborate upon this third path in Part II. Ours is a rational actor
model along the lines developed by positive political theory ("PPT")
and exploits the PPT assumption that institutional design and struc-
ture have profound effects on the way purposive, self-interested gov-
ernment institutions interact. Like Congress and the states, the
Supreme Court is an institution whose pursuit of goals is influenced by
the overall design of the political system. We have developed parts of
the theory working with John Ferejohn on issues of comparative con-
stitutional studies of former British Commonwealth countries (the
United States, United Kingdom, and Canada).6
3. By "traditional rule of law criteria," we refer to the consistency of decisions with consti-
tutional text, original intent of the Framers, and precedent (stare decisis).
4. See generally The Rule of Law, NOMOS XXXVI (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (papers ex-
ploring conditions necessary for the rule of law, and the value of the rule of law).
5. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
6. See Jenna Bednar et al., A Political Theory of Federalism (1995) (unpublished draft, on
file with authors) [hereinafter Bednar et al., Political Theory]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1355 (1994).
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We start with the relatively uncontroversial propositions that the
Constitution creates a federal polity with regulatory power divided be-
tween state and national governments, and that this federal arrange-
ment has advantages for the country.7 The political science literature
suggests, and the Framers believed, that such federal arrangements
are fragile, for all the participants have incentives to cheat in their
own self-interest but at the expense of the general good. Cheating by
either the central government or by individual states not only under-
mines one or more values of federalism, but encourages a competition
of cheating which threatens to undermine the Union itself.
The challenge of maintaining federal arrangements is what one of
us has called the "federal problem" of commitment: All the partici-
pants must themselves be discouraged from cheating, and they must
believe that other participants are discouraged from such conduct as
well. We identify various kinds of cheating at both the national and
state levels and explore the distinct risks posed by different modes of
cheating. The Framers believed that each mode could be controlled
through a combination of constitutional design and judicial enforce-
ment, albeit a distinct mix of design and enforcement for each kind of
cheating.
Part Ill of this Article applies our theory to understand as well as
evaluate the Court's federalism decisions described in Part I. There
are several reasons why a positive political theory is the best way for
understanding the Court's federalism decisions. One is the inade-
quacy of competing theories. The other justifications for federalism
discussed in Gregory, rooted in libertarian and republican values, are
neither analytically robust nor coherently explanatory of the Court's
line of decisions. Our analysis provides a framework for reading the
cases as a coherent whole. To the extent the Court is impelled in our
system to rationalize its case law over time, the theory developed in
this Article may be a useful vehicle. Moreover, our theory is one that
would have been particularly congenial to the Framers, who not only
established federalism as a central value in the Constitution but who
shared the rational choice assumptions of PPT. To the extent that our
7. These propositions are somewhat disputed-and brilliantly so-in Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism. Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rnv. 903 (1994).
8. Jenna Bednar, The Federal Problem (1995) (unpublished draft, on file with authors)
[hereinafter Bednar, Federal Problem].
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theory elaborates upon assumptions and choices made by the Fram-
ers, it provides a rationalization of the cases that should appeal to
judges interested in the Framers' original expectations.
The rational choice approach explored in this Article also pro-
vides a normative foundation for evaluating the Court's federalism de-
cisions. Our inclination is to deploy PPT as a means of figuring out
how to read questionable decisions; others might press our perspec-
tive more aggressively. Lopez, for example, might be criticized as well
as explained under our theory, and we find Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion hard to answer. Still, the main value of our approach is that it
provides a relatively systematic normative context from which we
should argue that Lopez ought not be read as a break with prior deci-
sions and ought not be the occasion for an aggressive resurgence of
Supreme Court monitoring of national jurisdictional limits. Instead,
Lopez is most sensibly read as a constitutional "wake up call." The
Court has reinserted itself as a monitor of congressional power, at
least (and we think at most as well) to remind Congress that it oper-
ates within constitutional limits. This in our view is the "best" reading
of the Court's decision, and one we urge the Court and lower courts to
follow.
I. MYSTERIES OF THE COURT'S FEDERALISM
DECISIONS
Few areas of constitutional law are more important than federal-
ism, and few areas have seen more doctrinal churning. Consider some
mysteries of the Court's constitutional federalism decisions over the
last twenty years. The treatment that follows is not exhaustive, be-
cause it does not thoroughly analyze the Court's jurisprudence of
habeas corpus, state tax burdens on interstate commerce, or intergov-
ernmental interference. Those other decisions fit with our analysis
generally, and we shall advert to them occasionally.
A. THE ELASTIC COMMERCE CLAUSE
American constitutional history is replete with the Supreme
Court's efforts to enforce some kind of "principled" limitations on na-
tional power. The Framers expected Congress to be genuinely limited
to and by the powers enumerated to it, especially those in Article I of
the Constitution. For most of our history, Congress and the Court
have been engaged in a pas de deux danced to the tune of the Com-
merce Clause in Article I, Section 8. Congress' authority to adopt
1450
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economic legislation has been largely defined by its ability to persuade
the Court that its goal and effect were to "regulate Commerce...
among the several states." The Court responded with a series of Com-
merce Clause "tests" that gradually expanded the ambit of congres-
sional power, while sometimes invalidating specific regulations.9
The New Deal Court created by new appointments after 1937 ar-
ticulated a much more elastic Commerce Clause. In United States v.
Darby,10 for example, the Court upheld congressional regulation of
local wages and hours on the ground that this was an "appropriate
means" to the ultimate goal of regulating commerce. Wickard v. Fil-
burn" held that Congress could reach local activities if they had an
aggregate effect on commerce. The Warren Court extended the rea-
soning of these cases to sustain Congress' power to adopt the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, based upon congressional findings that segrega-
tion ultimately affected commerce.' 2 The Burger Court extended this
chain-of-activities-until-interstate reasoning to sustain a law making
localized loan-sharking a federal crime in Perez v. United States.3 The
Court deferred to congressional findings that local loan-sharking con-
tributed to nationally organized crime syndicates. Those syndicates
interfered with interstate commerce. Hence, the loan-sharking law
was an appropriate, even if attenuated, means for Congress to regu-
late commerce.
For sixty years (1936 to 1995), the Court deferred to Congress in
every Commerce Clause case it decided. No statute was invalidated
on the ground that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause au-
thority. On the other hand, Commerce Clause norms did not go en-
tirely unenforced. The Court interpreted statutes narrowly, to avoid
unnecessary or uncontemplated congressional intrusions into local
matters traditionally left to state regulation. Even the New Deal
Court started "with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 4 Subsequent
Courts have followed this rule of statutory interpretation to assure
9. For this doctrinal back-and-forth, see, for example, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 128-35,151-56 (12th ed. 1991); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONSTrrTUnONAL LAW
186-93, 200-08 (2d ed. 1991).
10. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
11. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
12. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
13. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
14. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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that Congress' freedom under the Commerce Clause does not need-
lessly close off state regulatory efforts, but the ambit of this rule is
somewhat unclear. 15
Sometimes the Court effectively rewrote congressional enact-
ments to conform to Commerce Clause limitations. In United States v.
Bass, the Court imposed an interstate commerce requirement on a
federal firearms law. The law made it a crime when a convicted felon
"receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce
[a] firearm.' 6 In a case involving possession of a firearm, the Court
held that the statute required the government to prove that the "pos-
session" occurred "in commerce or affecting commerce.' 7 A dissent-
ing opinion objected that the statute was clear and was constitutional
under Perez, but the majority thought the statute susceptible to its
creative reading and reserved judgment on the constitutional issue.
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a divided Court
broke the federal government's six-decade winning streak in Com-
merce Clause cases. The Chief Justice's opinion did not clearly ex-
plain how the Court's invalidation of a law prohibiting possession of
firearms near schools was consistent with prior cases, but it floated
plenty of suggestions. First, the opinion suggested that criminal law is
an area of primary state responsibility.18 This suggestion was at some
odds with Perez, which the Chief Justice circumscribed by an ambi-
tious reading of Bass. Moreover, the opinion seemed concerned that
Congress did not make specific factual findings as to the link between
school firearm possession and interstate commerce,' 9 although prior
cases had not required such findings and Congress in other statutes
has lavishly made them.20 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist worried
that accepting the government's justifications in this case would leave
the federal-state boundary completely unmonitored by the Court.
2'
15. See the debate in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), among Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for a four-Justice plurality; and Justice Blackmun, writing for three concur-
ring Justices; and Justice Scalia, dissenting with Justice Thomas.
16. 404 U.S. 336, 337 (1971).
17. Id. at 347. Cf. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that Bass can
be satisfied by proof that the firearm had at some time been in interstate commerce).
18. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 & n.3 (1995).
19. Id. at 1631-32.
20. See id. at 1659-62, 1665-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 1632-33 (opinion of the Court).
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As Justice Breyer forcefully argued in dissent, Lopez-is in some
tension with the Court's post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. Justice Breyer would read the decision narrowly, as would Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor, who joined in a cautious concurring
opinion.22 In contrast, Justice Thomas' separate concurring opinion
maintained that the post-1937 cases have taken the Commerce Clause
far afield from the Framers' original vision, and that the Court must
abandon the "wrong turn" it took during the New Deal23 Justice Sou-
ter responded that the New Deal was the right turn and that the old
Commerce Clause cases were justifiably interred with their wicked
twin, Lochner v. New York. 24 Lopez was treated as a significant con-
stitutional moment by the Clinton administration, academics, and
gun-control advocates, but it is not clear how broadly the Rehnquist
Court will apply the new precedent.
B. TnE TRUISTIC TENTH AND EASY-TO-ABROGATE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENTS
Rather than giving bite to the limits instinct in a regime of enu-
merated powers, the Burger Court sought to constrain national au-
thority through an odd reliance on the nonconstraining Tenth
Amendment. Providing that "powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people,"5 the Tenth
Amendment seems little (if anything) more than a truism. Nonethe-
less, the Burger Court in National League of Cities v. Usery26 held that
Congress could not constitutionally extend the minimum wage and
maximum hour regulations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
to protect state employees such as police officers and firefighters.
Even though Congress clearly can regulate wages and hours of simi-
larly situated private employers under the Commerce Clause,27 the
Court held that the Tenth Amendment creates an additional layer of
protection for regulation of the "States qua States."'
22. Id. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 1650-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 1652-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
26. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
27. This is the holding of Darby v. United States, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), which is also the
decision where the Supreme Court dismissed the Tenth Amendment as a "truism." Id. at 124.
28. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 847.
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Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court reasoned that the Tenth
Amendment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Con-
gress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' in-
tegrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
'29
That the Tenth Amendment "expressly declares" no such thing is the
beginning of the doctrinal problems with National League of Cities.
Nor did Justice Rehnquist's opinion articulate an attractive theory of
federalism that would support his ambitious reading of the truistic
Tenth Amendment. Portions of his opinion seem to value state auton-
omy for its own sake, while other portions echo the two-spheres fea-
tures of the nineteenth century dual federalism cases.30 Neither line
of analysis explains why a layer-cake system of autonomous national
and state sovereigns is a desirable system. Both lines of analysis seem
at odds with the Court's decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,31 which held
that Congress has plenary power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court
lawsuits.
The rule announced in National League of Cities was that the fed-
eral government cannot "directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions" or otherwise undermine the states' "separate and in-
dependent existence."32 Because this rule was not well grounded in
either a constitutional text or a normative theory, it proved hard and
ultimately futile to apply.33 Its most dramatic nonapplication was in
FERC v. Mississippi,' where the Court upheld against Tenth Amend-
ment attack a congressional enactment that required state utility com-
missions to consider a specified list of approaches to rate structures
and to consider adoption of specified rules, after federally mandated
29. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,547 n.7 (1975)); see New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
30. The dual federalism cases rested upon the premise that state and federal authority were
mutually exclusive. Such a premise became rapidly untenable over the course of the nineteenth
century, as practical necessity impelled concurrent (overlapping) federal and state regulation of
a range of commercial matters. Other countries that have flirted with notions of mutually exclu-
sive state and federal authority have witnessed similar practical difficulties. See KAmnFIERE E.
SWNrroN, Tm SUPREME COURT AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM: THm LASKIN-DICKSON YEARS
(1990).
31. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
32. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
33. The Court upheld challenged federal regulations in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
(1983); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
34. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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public hearings were conducted and statements of reasons were is-
sued. This congressional directive strikes us as a more significant in-
trusion on state "autonomy" than National League of Cities' FLSA
rules had been. Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the
statute was an affront to the "cooperative federalism" instantiated in
the Constitution.35
After a decade of experience with National League of Cities, the
Court overruled it in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority.6 The issue was whether the FLSA could constitutionally be
applied to municipal public transit workers. The Court's internal dis-
cussions reveal how confused the Justices found this line of cases.
37
Some Justices thought the application unconstitutional because
"transit systems are essentially local... like water" (Chief Justice Bur-
ger's statement, according to Justice Brennan's notes), while other
Justices thought the application constitutional because state and local
governments had not historically performed mass transit functions.
The Court was clearly of two minds about the case-and so was one
of the Justices! Justice Blackmun announced at conference that a
"good opinion can be written either way" but that the application was
"local" and therefore not subject to regulation by Congress. Justice
Blackmun was assigned to write the opinion voiding the application,
but the opinion he later circulated held that the regulation was consti-
tutional. Justice Blackmun's cover memorandum stated that this area
was one of "widespread confusion" that could only be settled by a
bold rethinking.
Justice Blackmun's ultimate opinion for the Court in Garcia was
a bold but less than successful rethinking. The opinion first, and most
persuasively, argued that the inquiry as to whether the federal statute
trenches on "'traditional governmental functions' had been shown
practically "unworkable. '38 Because the test had neither a referent in
the Constitution nor a clearly articulated theoretical foundation, this
is unsurprising. The opinion then maintained that other possible ap-
proaches would be no better, a more problematic assertion.39 The
35. ld. at 783-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
36. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
37. The analysis that follows draws from Mark V. Tishnet, Why the Supreme Court Over-
ruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1994), which in turn is based upon the
Court's internal memoranda found in Justice Brennan's papers on deposit at the Library of
Congress.
38. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537-43.
39. Id. at 543-47.
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punch line, and apparent holding, of the opinion was that efforts to
craft judicially enforceable limitations on Congress' authority were in-
consistent with the constitutional design. "Apart from the limitation
on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Ar-
ticle I powers, the principal means chosen by the framers to ensure the
role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Fed-
eral Government itself "-specifically, state "control of electoral qual-
ifications" for House members, their "role in presidential elections,"
and their "equal representation" in the Senate and (before the Seven-
teenth Amendment) the selection of senators by state legislatures. 49,
Consequently, the political and not the judicial process is the protec-
tion for the "States qua States."
Justice Blackmun posed an important inquiry about whether the
Court could practically play a constructive role in adjudicating feder-
alism disputes, but the factual premises of his negative judgment were
vulnerable to criticism. Although commentators as well as Justices
shot holes in Garcia's outdated pronouncements about the states' for-
mal role in the national legislative process,41 South Carolina v. Baker42
extended that reasoning to insulate congressional direct taxation of
the states qua states from judicial review. Like Garcia, Baker held
open the possibility that the Court would invalidate a federal statute
where state interests were neglected because of "extraordinary" de-
fects in the national political process.
In the wake of Bitzer and Garcia, the Court had substantially
declawed the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as constitutional limi-
tations on congressional authority. But what the Court giveth in con-
stitutional interpretation, it can taketh away through statutory
40. Id. at 550-51 & n.11 (drawing from HERBERT WECHSLER, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, PoLrrCs AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1954); JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); and D. Bruce La Pierre, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of
the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982)).
41. See, ag., Martin Redish & Karen Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review"
The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1987); Bernard Schwartz, National
League of Cities Again-R.I.P. or a Ghost That Still Walks?, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 141 (1985);
William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1709 (1985); and
sources cited in note 132 infra. See generally Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare
Decisis and the Overruling of National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 341 (1985)
(criticizing Garcia's inability to construct a persuasive rationale for compromising stare decisis);
Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities,
2 CONST. COMMENTARY 123 (1985) (similar).
42. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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interpretation. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,43 Justice Pow-
ell's opinion for the Court concluded that "Congress may abrogate the
States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."44 Stressing that abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, though within congressional power, disrupts the "'constitution-
ally mandated balance of power' "45 between the federal government
and the states, the Court stated that "it is incumbent upon the federal
courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law
overrides the: guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The require-
ment that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statu-
tory language ensures such certainty."'  Since Atascadero, the Court
has stuck with this strong presumption against congressional waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity,47 and has applied a similarly strict
approach to judging whether a state itself has waived its Eleventh
Amendment rights.48
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company49 is the apotheosis of the
Court's ambivalence about both constitutional and clear statement
rules limiting congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. Five Justices (Brennan, Marshall, White, Blackmun, Ste-
vens-the same majority as in Garcia) expanded Bitzer to hold that
Congress, acting under the Commerce Clause rather than the Four-
teenth Amendment, can abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity. A different five Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
43. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
44. Id. at 242.
45. Id. at 242 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
46. Id. at 243. In dissent, Justice Brennan complained that the clear statement requirement
frustrated congressional intent and was designed simply "to keep the disfavored suits out of the
federal courts" based on "a fundamental policy decision, vaguely attributed to the Framers of
Article III or the Eleventh Amendment, that the federal courts ought not to hear suits brought
by individuals against States." Id. at 254 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, JJ., dissenting).
47. See the heated debate in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), as well as Hoffman v.
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The Court's application of the canon in Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), trumped other canons protecting Indian tribes against state
regulation. Blatchford raises the important question whether the Court's emerging federalism
jurisprudence ignores the federalism values instinct in the Court's Indian law jurisprudence.
48. See, e.g., Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (finding a state
waiver).
49. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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Stevens, Scalia) found that Congress in the Superfund Act had
"unambiguously" abrogated such immunity.
The Tenth Amendment followed the same clear statement road
as the Eleventh. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, ° the question was whether
the proscription against mandatory retirement provided by the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") prevented a state
from requiring its judges to retire by age seventy. The outcome
turned on whether a judge was an "employee" for purposes of the
statute. Elected state judges clearly came within an exception to the
definition of "employee" for elected officials; appointed state judges
also arguably came within a different exception, one for "appointee[s]
on the policymaking level."'51 This was not a difficult case,52 yet it
became an important one.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court created a clear state-
ment rule against federal regulation of at least some state functions.
"[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political
process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Con-
gress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that
Congress intended such an exercise. 5 3 Because the ADEA by no
means targeted state judges for inclusion in its statutory scheme, the
Court held those state officials excluded under Gregory's new "super-
strong clear statement rule."54 With typical perversity in these cases,
the Court declined to apply this new super-strong clear statement rule
to the Voting Rights Act, in a decision handed down the same day as
Gregory.55
50. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
51. The exceptions were for "any person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision ... or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
52. The admitted ambiguity of the "policymaker" exception could have been easily re-
solved through well-established canons and conventional statutory interpretive approaches, and
appointed judges should fall outside the ADEA and be subject to state rules about retirement.
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 474-85 (White, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment); Philip P. Frickey, Lawnet: The Case of the Missing (Tenth)
Amendment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 755 (1991).
53. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
54. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992).
55. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). In Chisom, the Court broadly interpreted
"representatives" in the Voting Rights Act to authorize federal regulation of elected state
judges. The Court did not cite Gregory or its rule of construction. See Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 54, at 634-36.
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Even though Gregory was a statutory interpretation case whose
new rule of interpretation was immediately ignored by the Court it-
self, it marked the beginning of the Tenth Amendment's rehabilita-
tion. In New York v. United States,5 6 the Court struck down that
portion of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act Amendments of
1985 that "commandeered" state regulatory apparatus by requiring
them to take title (and potential liability) to radioactive wastes that
they did not dispose of before 1996. The Court's decision was surpris-
ing in light of FERC v. Mississippi, a pre-National League of Cities
decision where the Court had brushed aside an arguably stronger
claim, and astounding in light of Garcia. As to the latter, New York
rescued the Tenth Amendment from the truism status required by
Garcia, even though the statute invalidated was an excellent example
of Garcia's thesis. That is, the states not only were active within the
federal legislative process (successfully extracting federal concessions,
for example) but had arguably ratified the final deal.57
New York continued what Justice O'Connor called the Court's
"unsteady path.""8 The Court declined to overrule Garcia, even
though New York's result and reasoning cast doubt upon that prece-
dent and its viability in at least some circumstances.5 9 If Garcia were
overruled or narrowed, the Court would have to rethink South Caro-
lina as well. Such a rethinking could also be fatal to Union Gas' hold-
ing that Congress acting under its Commerce Clause authority can
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment rights. Four of the five Jus-
tices in the Union Gas and Garcia majorities have left the Court. The
four Union Gas dissenters and three of the four Garcia dissenters are
still on the Court, and they all joined Lopez and New York. Thus, not
only is the Court's path already unsteady, but changes in the Court's
personnel may twist the path even further askew in the future.
Another doctrinal quandary is the status of Gregory's super-
strong clear statement rule if Garcia is overruled or severely nar-
rowed. Is the clear statement rule necessary if the Court is willing to
56. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
57. See id. at 188-200 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The three dis-
senters (Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens) were the only Justices remaining from the origi-
nal Garcia majority. All four Justices appointed after 1985 (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
and Thomas) joined Justice O'Connor's New York opinion.
58. ld. at 160 (opinion of the Court).
59. Id. at 205-07 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cf Deborah Jones
Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism." Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563,
1576-78 & n.51 (1994) (arguing that Garcia should not be read to justify application of FLSA to
state police officers, even though lower courts soon after New York upheld such applications).
1995] 1459
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1459 1994-1995
1 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1447
police Congress directly? One might think that the Supreme Court
would be cautious in applying the Gregory clear statement rule. Not
so. In 1994, the Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.60 invoked
Gregory to narrow the plain meaning of the federal Bankruptcy Code,
so that it would not disrupt state title and foreclosure law (the appar-
ent purpose of the narrowed provision).61 BFP is an odd venue for
the Gregory canon, as the narrowed provision was not regulating the
states qua states (none of the parties cited or considered Gregory rele-
vant). BFP is better understood as an example of the related but dis-
tinct canon presuming against federal preemption of state law in areas
traditionally regulated by the states.62 Nonetheless, BEP highlights
the doctrinal confusion of the Court's new super-strong clear state-
ment rules in federalism cases: When do they apply? What do they
even stand for?
C. Ti IMPLICrr DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Equally curious, from a rule of law perspective, are the Supreme
Court's decisions enforcing a "dormant" commerce clause against
state regulations burdening interstate commerce. Originating in the
nineteenth century dual federalism cases suggesting that states were
precluded from regulating at least some of the areas enumerated for
national regulation, the twentieth century dormant commerce clause
cases suffer under a debatable link to either the constitutional text or
the Framers' intent.63 A mystery is that the Court has been much
60. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
61. Section 548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code invalidates foreclosure sales of mort-
gaged real estate by insolvent debtors within a year of bankruptcy unless there is an exchange for
"a reasonably equivalent value." Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that courts could not
invalidate such sales based upon findings of no "reasonably equivalent value" and maintained
that the statutory language is not sufficiently "clear and manifest" to "displace traditional state
regulation" of foreclosure sales, explicitly invoking Gregory. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765 & n.8.
62. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); cf. id. at 2632(Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (the author of the later opinion in BFP
denouncing this canon as "extraordinary and unprecedented").
63. The Court occasionally mentions this difficulty. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,623 (1978) ("The bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of
the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to
its basic purpose."); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 n.9 (1994).
A good number of constitutional scholars express attitudes that range from dubious to
scornful about the textlessness of the dormant commerce clause. Some urge transferring its
functions to the (more narrow) Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. E.g., Julian
Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.E. 425, 446-55 (1982); Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DuKi L.J. 569, 606-12. For a defense, see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
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more vigorous in enforcing this "dormant" provision of the Constitu-
tion than it has in enforcing the truistic Tenth Amendment, the pro-
tean Eleventh Amendment, or the elastic "real" Commerce Clause.
In the 1993 Term, for example, the Court struck down state or local
regulations in four different dormant commerce clause cases.64 This
activist record gave the implicit constitutional provision greater bite
that term than any of the provisions (including the individual fights
provisions) explicitly set forth in the Constitution.65
Like the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment cases, the
Court's dormant commerce clause cases have "taken some turns.
66
Most theories start with the premise that the dormant commerce
clause reflects the Framers' overall design that the federal system
avoid the "Balkanization" of the Articles of Confederation period,
but that not all state and local burdens on interstate commerce should
be invalidated. Several different approaches have been developed to
draw the line between permissible and impermissible burdens. Justice
Powell's plurality opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp.67 illustrates one approach. In striking down Iowa's restrictions
on travel by large trucks through the state, Justice Powell balanced the
burden on interstate commerce against local safety benefits. 68  The
Kassel approach threatens to turn the dormant commerce clause into
an ad hoc regime thrusting the courts into ever more difficult judg-
ments about state policies, without a clear constitutional text or robust
political theory to guide them.69 Justice Stewart's opinion in City of
Court and State Protectionisn: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1091 (1986).
64. See West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. 2205; Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815
(1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994); C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
65. The Speech Clause of the First Amendment was involved in two cases where the Court
invalidated state regulations, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994), and Ibanez v. Flor-
ida Dep't of Business & Prof. Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994); one case where the Court
modified (but largely approved) a state injunction, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 2516 (1994); and one case where the Court remanded the matter for factfinding, Waters v.
Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
66. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1336 (1995).
67. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
68. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, emphasizing protectionist motivations of key
state officials, illustrates a variation of this approach. ld. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
69. This is the charge made by Justice Scalia in CTS Corp. v, Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69,
94-97 (1987) (Scalia, 3., concurring); see also Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,257 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that reliance on the Commerce Clause as a check on state, as opposed to federal, legislation is
"shaky").
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Philadelphia v. New Jersey7 0 illustrates another approach. In striking
down a state law preventing out-of-state trash from being imported
into the state, the Court applied a "virtual per se rule of invalidity"
when a state or local law discriminates on its face against interstate
commerce.
7 1
Especially in the arena of waste and trash disposal, the dormant
commerce clause has become a major instrument of judicial activ-
ism,72 and considerable case-by-case innovation.73 For example, the
Court in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown74 struck down a
town ordinance that required solid waste to be processed at one local
transfer station, which would later be taken over by the town. Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court simply declared the ordinance a "dis-
crimination" against interstate commerce, without any careful analysis
(as required by City of Philadelphia) of whether the measure was pro-
tectionist.75 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, based upon
a Kassel finding that the town's regulatory objectives did not outweigh
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce. 76 Justice Souter's dis-
senting opinion maintained that both approaches slighted the town's
regulatory objective, which was not protectionist but allegedly arose
out of a need to centralize local trash processing.77 Justice Souter's
position seems not only more sensible, but also more consistent with
the federalist philosophy of New York and Gregory, yet six Justices
(including Justice O'Connor, the author of New York and Gregory)
disagreed.
Each line of cases described in this part (constitutional limits on
federal regulation, constitutional limits on federal regulation of the
states, and constitutional limits on state regulation) might be charac-
terized as internally incoherent-shifting directions erratically and
containing hard-to-explain inconsistencies over time. Is Lopez consis-
tent with Wickard, the Civil Rights Act Cases, and Perez? Can Garcia
survive New York, or are the cases distinguishable? If Garcia bites the
70. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
71. Id. at 624.
72. For recent cases, see Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envt'l Quality, 114 S.
Ct. 1345 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112
S. Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
73. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (applying the dormant
commerce clause for the first time to strike down a state tax-and-subsidy scheme).
74. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
75. Id. at 1682.
76. Id. at 1687 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 1696-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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constitutional dust, can Union Gas and South Carolina survive? Is
Gregory's clear statement rule necessary in a regime characterized by
New York? Should the Court overrule Kassel and limit the dormant
commerce clause to instances of facial discrimination against inter-
state commerce, as in City of Philadelphia? Does Carbone unnecessa-
rily extend City of Philadelphia?
These lines of cases are also mutually incoherent, that is, each line
of authority is at odds with each other line. Does Garcia, which rea-
sons that federalism limits on Congress are best enforced by the polit-
ical process, survive the Court's decision in Lopez, which insists that
the Court remain as a monitor of congressional power? Why should
the Supreme Court be so active in reviewing state incursions on the
federalist bargain, while remaining relatively passive in reviewing na-
tional incursions? Is the Court's concern for state autonomy in cases
like New York at odds with the Court's extraordinary invasions of
state autonomy in cases like Carbone?
Other problems will surely occur to other scholars.
II. A POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF FEDERALISM
Justice O'Connor's decision in Gregory contains the Court's most
sophisticated theorizing about why federalism is constitutionally desir-
able. We detect in her opinion traces of three distinct theories. A
libertarian theory maintains that the federal structure assures a
"double security," because citizens' liberty is much harder to trammel
under a double layer of sovereign power.7' Although invoking this
theory as the one at least some of the Framers had in mind, Justice
O'Connor expressed doubt that the theory is a robust one,79 and we
concur.
In our modern regulatory state, two layers of government seem as
likely to impose double as to impose half the burdens that a single
layer of government would impose. Moreover, such a libertarian the-
ory of federalism is at odds with American constitutional history since
the founding generation. The Reconstruction amendments and their
78. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (quoting THm FEDERALST No. 51
(James Madison); THm FEDERALST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton)).
79. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59 ("One can fairly dispute whether our federal system has
been quite as successful in checking government abuses as Hamilton promised."). Unfortu-
nately, Justice O'Connor spoke more approvingly of the double security theory in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144,155-59 (1992), and this was the only theory invoked in United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
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interpretation to "incorporate" and apply the Bill of Rights to the
states are derogations from federalism. Their effect is to render
rights-based protections more important for individual liberty than
federalism-based protections. Whatever viability the Framers' liberta-
rian theory had for federalism originally, it has been overtaken by the
rights-based libertarian approach followed since the Civil War.
The Court itself has pressed liberty and federalism in antipodal
directions even more than the above analysis would suggest, and a
libertarian reading of federalism wbuld be inconsistent with the
Court's recent decisions. If a libertarian, "double security" theory
were taken seriously, the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence would
have to be rethought, for example. Under the banner of "our federal-
ism," the Court for twenty years has been curtailing the availability of
federal courts to second-guess state court deprivations of individual
liberty. Gregory itself invoked federalism norms to trump the liberta-
rian claims of elderly Missouri judges who were subjected to age dis-
crimination. The Framers' libertarian theory of federalism is not a
solid basis for explaining or defending the Court's existing federalism-
based doctrines or for urging changes in these doctrines.
Developing themes introduced in Justice O'Connor's dissent in
FERC v. Mississippi, Gregory expressed a warmer endorsement of a
republican, or democracy-enhancing, theory of federalism. This way
of structuring sovereignty
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportu-
nity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry.80
These values seem more robust in the modem state, and they ought to
inform the Court's federalism jurisprudence. Moreover, these values
provide an attractive framework for understanding many of the
Court's decisions, especially New York, Atascadero, and Lopez.
On the other hand, there are descriptive and prescriptive
problems with this theory. As a matter of accounting for the Court's
precedents, republican theory has difficulty with Mississippi, Garcia,
and South Carolina, all decisions from which Justice O'Connor dis-
sented. The Court in those cases expressed a tolerance for burdens on
80. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE W.
1425 (1987); Merritt, supra note 59.
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state governments that would seem to undermine the states' capacity
for responsiveness, innovation, and so forth. If Congress can capri-
ciously foist increased costs onto the states-by requiring states to pay
their employees more (Garcia) or by directly depleting their tax base
(South Carolina) or by requiring them to conduct regulatory hearings
(Mississippi)-Congress can undermine local capacity for self-govern-
ment. Justice O'Connor's theory would seem to require judicial moni-
toring of such activities, but the Court intervened in none of these
cases. There is also some tension between this theory and Union Gas
and even Bitzer. Why should the federal government be able to abro-
gate the states' constitutional right not to be sued in federal court?
Do these precedents not allow the same kinds of burdens that Greg-
ory and New York found objectionable?
There are deeper, normative problems with this theory of federal-
ism. The republican virtues extolled by Justice O'Connor can be met
by a nationalist system that is "decentralized" rather than "federal-
ized." Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley maintain that federalism is
unnecessary to achieve O'Connor's republican goals, and further that
constitutionalizing federalism as the Court has done detracts from
those goals by removing administrative flexibility to decentralize in
functional (for example, around metropolitan areas) rather than for-
mal (for example, around state boundaries) ways. 1 In a related way,
Justice O'Connor's theory seems insufficiently sensitive to the
Supremacy Clause. Right after conceding that the Supremacy Clause
suggests that "Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated
by the States," 2 Justice O'Connor remarkably cautioned, "This is an
extraordinary power in a federalist system."83 In light of the New
Deal, Justice O'Connor's statement is itself "extraordinary," for it
would imply a surly reception for federal regulation of local air pollu-
tion, educational and residential apartheid, discrimination in the
workplace, and so forth.84 Gregory assumes a stance that is slightly
akimbo to the balance between state and federal regulation that the
Constitution seems to require, and reverses the priorities ordered by
the Supremacy Clause.
81. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 7, at 914-26.
82. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
83. 1&
84. kla It is ironic that this localist statement is taken almost verbatim from Herbert
Wechsler's 1954 article (see supra note 40, at 49-50), the same article that formed the intellectual
basis for Garcia (from which Justice O'Connor issued a heartfelt dissent). The statement was
quaint when Wechsler wrote it, and strikingly out of date in 1990 when Justice O'Connor revived
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The problem of balance is also presented by the dormant com-
merce clause cases. Why should state and local laboratories of experi-
mentation be regulated beyond the Supremacy Clause? Why would
Justice O'Connor acquiesce, as she has done in cases like Carbone, in
the Court's "extraordinary" activism enforcing a non-clause clause
against state experiments?85 The best candidate to fill this analytical
gap in republican theory is Justice Stone's representation-reinforce-
ment defense of dormant commerce clause review, as elaborated by
Professor Tushnet.86 Such a theory would regulate one local electo-
rate's efforts to "export" regulatory costs to interests unrepresented in
the local political system. But this theory does not sufficiently explain
the Court's decisions, especially the many opinions invalidating state
and local pollution control regulations. In City of Philadelphia, for
example, the state prohibition against out-of-state trash would have
pitted powerful in-state interests against each other: homeowners and
environmentalists who favored the regulation versus trash disposal en-
trepreneurs and owners of landfills who opposed the regulation. New
Jersey's regulation was democracy in action (the homeowners won,
the landfill operators lost), but democracy was trumped by the
Supreme Court's valorization of a completely free interstate market.
Although preferable to libertarian theory, Justice O'Connor's re-
publican theory of federalism is at least incomplete. There is a third
way of understanding the value of federalism and the role of the
Supreme Court, and there is a whiff of such a theory in Gregory's
reference to the value of making "government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. T87 In this part
we shall develop this suggestion by outlining a theory of judicial feder-
alism that draws upon a rational choice theory of the political process,
85. Justice O'Connor herself tends toward an ad hoc approach to the dormant commerce
clause, balancing the benefits of local regulation against the costs it imposes on interstate com-
merce. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677,1687 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment). This seems an insufficient protection of state interests and
sharply inconsistent with Gregory's philosophy.
86. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177,189-92 (1938);
see also Mark Thshnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125 (in-
cluding an important revival and elaboration of Justice Stone's insight). Recall that Justice Stone
in 1938 also authored the celebrated footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), the germinal case for representation-reinforcing theories of judicial
review generally. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT 73-104 (1980).
87. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. Justice O'Connor at this point cites Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Framers' Design, 54 U. Cu. L. Rv. 1489, 1491-511 (1984) (book
review), whose defense of federalism closely follows and largely reiterates arguments made by
Gordon Tullock and other rational choice theorists. See the references in note 88 infra.
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namely, PPT. This theory assumes that institutional and other actors
will pursue self-interested goals in the political process, that actors will
behave strategically (that is, condition their actions upon responses of
others), and hence that actions will be strongly influenced by the
structure or framework in which they occur. PPT maintains that insti-
tutional design affects behavior, and that design can ameliorate collec-
tive action problems. We believe that the Framers operated under
such assumptions, and that institutional theory better captures their
aspirations than either a simple libertarian or republican theory.
We will demonstrate that the advantages of federalism, especially
the establishment of competition among the states, have the unin-
tended consequence of creating an incentive for the various political
decisionmakers, both at state and federal levels, to try to shift the bur-
den of membership on to the other actors. In this Article we refer to
such behavior as "cheating." Institutions can be effective in combat-
ting the adverse effects of competition, although their efficacy de-
pends upon the particular kind of cheating to be resolved. We
demonstrate the utility of various institutional mechanisms and focus
upon the role of the Court.
A. THE ADVANTAGES OF FEDERALISM
In a heterogenous society, a federal system can better satisfy
political preferences and economic needs, especially over time, than
can a simple unitary government. 88 Consider a unitary sovereign state
with 100 people, sixty of whom desire policy A and forty of whom
desire not-A.8 9 Under majority rule, the state will choose policy A,
leaving sixty of its citizens satisfied and forty dissatisfied. If the state
were a federation rather than unitary, more of its citizens' preferences
will likely be satisfied. Assume, for example, that one province con-
tains fifty citizens desiring policy A and ten citizens desiring not-A and
the second province contains ten citizens desiring policy A and thirty
citizens desiring not-A.
88. Early political economists have argued this point convincingly, either explicitly or im-
plicitly. See eg., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, Tm CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962); ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY- RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); Charles M. liebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, 64 J. PoL. ECON. 416 (1956); Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB.
CHOICE 19 (1969). Important recent works include VINCENT OS'ROM, TI-E MEANINO OF AMER-
ICAN FEDERALISM (1991); WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972); PAUL E. PETER-
SON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995) [hereinafter PETERSON, PRICE OF FEDERALISM];
FEDERALISM AND aTrm CANADIAN ECONOMIC UNION (Michael J. Trebilcock ed., 1983).
89. The example in text is taken straight out of Tullock, supra note 88, at 22.
1995] 1467
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1467 1994-1995
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1447
TABLE I
PREFERRING A PREFERRING NoT-A
PROVINCE 1 50 10
PROVINCE 2 10 30
Under this scenario, the policies adopted by each province (A and
not-A, respectively) would satisfy the preferences of eighty citizens,
leaving only twenty citizens dissatisfied.90 The satisfaction effect of
the federal arrangement would be enhanced if dissatisfied citizens
from each province were to move to the province that better satisfied
their preferences. Under an ideal scenario, twenty people would
move, and everyone would be satisfied.91
This simple game of preference satisfaction becomes more inter-
esting if viewed over time and under conditions of uncertainty about
the eventual outcome if a particular policy were chosen.92 Assume
that most of the citizens of the polity are uncertain about whether
policy A is a good idea or not; a unitary state will adopt no policy in
most circumstances. However, if the polity is a federation of two
provinces and the citizens of one province have an interest in imple-
menting policy A despite its uncertainties, 93 then that province will
adopt the policy, while the other province will not. Over time, the
first province will gain experience with policy A, and voters of both
provinces will be able to observe whether it is a good policy. If it
proves to be a good policy, the second province or the national gov-
ernment will adopt policy A. If policy A proves to be a bad policy, the
90. There is no way of cutting up the 100 citizens that would yield less satisfaction, and
many ways that would yield more satisfaction, albeit sometimes just a little bit more. For exam-
ple, if 31 people in province 1 preferred not-A (29 preferring A), and only 9 in province 2 pre-
ferred not-A (31 preferring A), the overall satisfaction would rise only from 60 to 62 (31 citizens
in each province with satisfied preferences).
91. This point is not in Tuilock, supra note 88, but is an obvious corollary from Hiscm.
MAN, supra note 88. It is also explicitly noted as an advantage of federalism in Gregory. See text
accompanying notes 80-87 supra.
92. The analysis in the text that follows is simply a rational choice version of Justice Bran-
deis' famous argument for federalism in order to protect the states as "laboratories" of experi-
mentation. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,788 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) (finding that the states often serve as "laboratories" for the development
of new social, economic, and political ideas).
93. Consider a policy that has benefits from implementation that are separate from the
potential (but uncertain) outcome, such as job creation or boosting a local industry. If these
separate benefits accrue asymmetrically to the provinces, the one that stands to gain the most
from its implementation is most likely to be amenable to accepting the risk of the policy than the
other province.
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citizens of the first province might repeal the policy, despite its sepa-
rate benefits. Indeed, under a federal system the first province has
strong incentives to monitor the efficacy of policy A, because citizens
dissatisfied with it might well "vote with their feet," exercising their
right to move to the second province.94
The foregoing analysis provides a rationale for the constitutional
clich6 that ordinary "police powers"9 are presumptively left to state
and local governments. The analysis also suggests why policies of eco-
nomic development should be handled most efficiently at the local
rather than national level in a federation.96 Provinces in a federation
(or states in the United States) not only have incentives to provide for
the absolute well-being of their own citizens, but also incentives to
advance the relative well-being of their citizens, that is, their well-be-
ing compared to that of citizens elsewhere. Where there is free mobil-
ity within the federation, local governments are in competition with
one another to maximize the welfare of their respective citizens. If
one local government falls behind, as by providing rotten schools or
police services, it will tend to lose citizens to the more efficient gov-
ernments, unless it offers countervailing benefits not offered by those
other jurisdictions. Thus, local governments will aspire not just to
provide basic services, but also to expand the pie for their citizens
through developmental projects that help everyone.
If the states are engines of efficient development and police ser-
vice, what role ought the national government to play? The most ob-
vious role for the national government is to provide public goods that
the states are unlikely to provide through ordinary cooperation: a uni-
fied foreign policy, the interstate highway system, and the hydrogen
bomb. 97 An equally important role for the national government is to
prevent destructive interstate competition, such as tolls, and tariffs
94. For an explication of this collective action problem, see Charles C. Brown & Wallace E.
Oates, Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System, 32 J. PuB. ECON. 307 (1987); Mark V. Pauly,
Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 35 (1973). See generally PAUL E.
PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 1-31 (1986) [hereinafter PETERSON ET AL, WHEN
FEDERAUSM WOR, KS].
95. By police powers, we mean the standard day-to-day public goods offered by the gov-
ernment: education, roads, some public utilities, trash collection, police and fire protection, rules
governing sexuality and families, zoning, and nuisance abatement.
96. This analysis is largely taken from PETERSON ET AL, WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS,
supra note 94, at 69-72, 79. See also PETERSON, PRICE OF FEDERALISM, supra note 88 (similar
analysis).
97. On the collective action problems involved in producing such public goods, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACTION (1964).
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against out-of-state products. Such trade wars are prisoners' dilem-
mas, in which states acting in their own self-interests have incentives
to adopt policies which will beggar the polity. That is, each state
adopts a toll which would benefit its coffers, but if all states adopt such
tolls, interstate commerce will be so discouraged that all states will be
worse off. (We explain the prisoners' dilemma problem below.)
Trade wars are the most obvious example of such dilemmas. A
less obvious example is the celebrated "race to the bottom," which we
now illustrate.98 Return to our original configuration of preferences
for policy A (Table 1). Assume that policy A represents strong meas-
ures to limit industrial pollution of air and water. Province 1 adopts
such a policy, but province 2 does not. In the long term, policy A
might be an excellent policy, but in the short or medium term adop-
tion of the policy might undermine the ability of province 1 to attract
or retain businesses. As province 1 loses businesses and citizens to
province 2, it will feel electoral pressure to repeal its policy, not be-
cause it has changed its preferences about the policy but because it
faces dire consequences along a different dimension.99 Note that in
the race to the bottom, the "bottom" is not necessarily the lowest
preference; as long as competition encourages neighboring provinces
to underprovide, it is conceivable that the ultimate policy adopted will
include little or no regulation of industrial pollution, by most accounts
a suboptimal provision of welfare. In such circumstances, it is desira-
ble to have national regulation, essentially forcing policy A onto prov-
ince 2, in order to avoid a race to the bottom.
B. INCENTrVES FOR CHEATING ON THE FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT
AND WHY THEY MIGHT BE DISASTOUS
As presented above, the federal arrangement offers many advan-
tages for a polity, but those advantages can evanesce if key actors
cheat on the federal arrangement. For simplicity, we shall focus on
98. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBuc Fr CE 132-33 (1959); PAUL
E. PETRSON, CrrY Lmmrns 27-29 (1981); Wallace E. Oates, An Economist's Perspective on Fiscal
Federalism, in THE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 3 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977).
99. The situation might be worse than we describe. Even if the citizens of province 2 them-
selves desire policy A, they might have a higher preference for policy B, namely, attracting busi-
nesses and expanding its economic and tax base. Province 2's willingness to trade off policy A
for policy B would, in a prisoners' dilemma world, have the same effect as the scenario in text.
Additionally, to the extent that province 1 anticipates the reactions of province 2 and businesses,
it will be discouraged from adopting policy A-its strongly preferred policy-in the first place.
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Congress and the states as the key actors.'00 If the cheating becomes
such that it is no longer beneficial for some actors to participate in the
federation, the federation will likely collapse. It is in this sense that
our theory differs from traditional political science scholarship on fed-
eralism. Traditional scholarship typically addresses questions of fiscal
federalism, that is, the appropriate or prescriptive division of powers.
Ours is a political theory of federalism; we are concerned with the
maintenance of the federal nature of the polity in order to maximize
the benefits to a heterogeneous citizenry.
We indicated above that the failure of federalism results from a
tendency of the actors to violate the terms of the federation. 101 This
occurs even in a federation that creates significant benefits for all par-
ticipants. As long as costs exist (despite the fact of a net benefit),
participants in the federation will be tempted to shift these costs onto
other actors. The concept flows from the logic of a prisoners' di-
lemma, which we now explain.
In a prisoners' dilemma game, two prisoners who apparently co-
operated in a crime are presented with separate plea bargains. Each is
told that if he turns state's evidence he will get off entirely, if his part-
ner turns and he does not he gets an unusually high sentence, and if
both turn they both get normal sentences. The payoff or benefit for
each prisoner for each of four possible outcomes is reflected in Table
2. Higher ordinal numbers reflect higher benefits (not higher
sentences), and prisoner 1's payoff is always listed first.
TABLE 2
PRISONER 2 LOYAL PRISONER 2 DEECrS
PRISONER 1 LOYAL 10, 10 0, 15
PRISONER 1 DEFECTS 15, 0 5, 5
The collective utility of the two prisoners is greatest (20) if they re-
main loyal to one another and lowest (10) if they both defect. Perhaps
100. Our simplification does not ignore the importance of nonterritorial actors or interests.
However, in our model, it is assumed that the federal structure provides a framework or con-
straint within which other actors participate. The interests of nonterritorial actors are assumed
to be represented within the federal and provincial governments.
101. The following model is drawn primarily from the current dissertation work of one of
the authors. See Bednar, Federal Problem, supra note 8, at 15-25. See also PETERSON, PRICE OF
FEDERAUSM, supra note 88 (posing as a challenge to federalism the possibility that costs im-
posed by rent-seeking national legislation might outweigh benefits of the functional division of
labor); Bednar et al., Political Theory, supra note 6, at 6-7 (applying commitment theory to
compare political systems in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States).
1995] 1471
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1471 1994-1995
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1447
surprisingly, however, so long as neither knows what the other is do-
ing, each prisoner will defect. Prisoner 1 will consider the deal offered
by his jailers in the following way: If I am loyal, my possible payoffs
will be ten (prisoner 2 is also loyal) or zero (prisoner 2 defects). On
the other hand, if I defect, my possible payoffs will be fifteen (prisoner
2 is loyal) or five (prisoner 2 also defects). Since my possible payoffs
are higher for defection than for loyalty, whatever prisoner 2 does, I
should defect. Prisoner 2 engages in the same rational calculus and
also decides to defect. Also, although neither our theory nor the pris-
oners' dilemma explicitly discusses relative gains, note the signifi-
cantly worse penalty for being honest when the other cheats (in this
case, zero), appropriately known as "the sucker's payoff," which eve-
ryone wants to avoid. Both have incentives to cheat, yet this is the
worst result for the prisoners as a group.
The prisoners' dilemma is a way to think about trade wars, a
longstanding justification for forming federations. The good of all is
best served by eliminating barriers to trade, but each state is tempted
to impose such barriers, thereby posing a danger that all states will do
so. Ironically, although one incentive for states to form a federation is
to avoid the disadvantages of trade wars and other such prisoners'
dilemmas, the prisoners' dilemma threatens the stability of the federa-
tion even after it is formed. For even if an actor had decided to be-
have honestly and act according to the terms of the federal
arrangement, it would be foolish to do so given the costliness of being
honest when another actor cheats. Therefore, as long as the suspicion
of cheating exists, it is in the interest of all actors to cheat.
The prisoners' dilemma, inherent in all federal arrangements, cre-
ates a commitment problem. At the birth of a federation, each state
commits to respect and obey the rules of the federation and the feder-
ation commits to respect and not invade the autonomy of the various
states. The benefits of the federation flow most readily when all ac-
tors are obeying their commitments (the upper left quadrant of Table
2). Each state and the national government has an incentive to im-
prove its position by cheating (lower left and upper right quadrants).
Once the other states learn of even partial defection, they can be ex-
pected to cheat in order to avoid the sucker's payoff. Serial defections
and rampant cheating will negate the benefits of the federal arrange-
ment and may even destroy the federation. We now consider in
greater detail the precise incentives that Congress and the states have
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to cheat on the federal arrangement established in the United States
Constitution.
Responding to the pressures of national distributive politics, Con-
gress may respond in ways that detract from the benefits of federalism
and, ultimately, might sabotage the arrangement altogether. To begin
with, Congress might aggrandize its own power by legislating aggres-
sively and preemptively in areas traditionally left to the states. Recall
our discussion of the national solution of the race-to-the-bottom prob-
lem. By adopting policy A for the entire nation, Congress is negating
the basic advantage of federalism for a polity with heterogeneous
preferences, namely, the possibility that different policies in different
provinces will satisfy more citizens' preferences. Because political de-
bates about distributive as well as many other issues will usually gravi-
tate to the national level sooner or later, and because many such
statutes will also preempt local police and development policies, the
possibility arises that some benefits of federalism will be lost. It is
worth losing the benefits of federalism when national regulation is
needed for public goods or race-to-the-bottom reasons, but often not
when national regulation represents nothing more than the substitu-
tion of distributional policies for developmental policies.
In a related way, Congress will be tempted to burden the states
themselves as a consequence of national distributive politics. This is
most destabilizing if the burdens are not equally shared by all states;
charges of favoritism, or systematic discrimination against certain
states or an entire region of the country, create strong incentives for
the overburdened to depart from the federation. 10 2 National regula-
tory burdens on the states would also be serious problems for federal-
ism if they threatened the fundamental autonomy (the ability of the
state to perform its day-to-day functions) or integrity (the ability of
the state to structure itself) of at least some states.
A third, and perhaps most serious, form of congressional cheating
involves commandeering the states to carry out, at their expense, fed-
eral regulatory programs. Members of Congress desiring electoral
popularity or media prominence will want to sponsor regulatory pro-
grams purporting to solve some problem or serve a relevant interest.
If such programs come at the expense of raising taxes or cutting other
programs, they are much riskier. Therefore, members of Congress
102. However, in some cases, the cost of exiting might be prohibitive, in which case the
federation might live in a perpetual state of instability. Consider, for example, the situation of
Quebec within the Canadian federation.
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have incentives to enact laws whose administrative costs are borne by
other institutions, namely, the states. Commandeering the state regu-
latory apparatus is a threat to the autonomy or integrity of state gov-
ernments, and this formal threat has possibly severe functional
consequences. Because state officials are beset by the same pressures
as federal officials, they may have to sacrifice police and developmen-
tal priorities in order to obey unfunded federal mandates.
Responding to the pressures of local distributive politics, individ-
ual states may respond in ways that detract from the benefits of feder-
alism and, ultimately, might sabotage the arrangement altogether.
The consequences of state cheating are just as dire as the conse-
quences of congressional exploitation: Both deprive the federation of
advantages that might accrue from the federal arrangement and may
undermine the existence of the federation itself. By state cheating we
mean strategies through which a state seeks to reap the benefits of
federalism (such as a free and well-functioning interstate market for
its goods) while not accepting the costs of federalism.
The mildest form of state cheating is shirking, where a state ac-
cepts the benefits of national policies generally, cooperates in the im-
plementation and enforcement of policies it favors, but then fails to
implement or enforce national policies not in the perceived local self-
interest. Where the national policy (such as reducing pollution or reg-
ulating firearms) requires a truly national collective effort to succeed,
state shirking undermines those policies, presumably to the detriment
of citizens everywhere. Shirking is a more serious infraction where it
allows the state to gain a comparative advantage on other states, as by
lowering costs of doing business in the state. Once initiated, shirking
by some can trigger a new race to the bottom by all.
States are also tempted to breach their commitments by imposing
externalities on other states. An externality is a cost imposed on an-
other state without accompanying compensation. An example would
be a state restriction against heavy trucks traveling within the state.
Such a rule would benefit the state by ensuring that only lighter and
less damaging trucks traveled on the state's roads, but also by encour-
aging trucks to bypass the state altogether and thereby damaging the
roads of the detour states. The latter effect is an externality. Once
one state adopts such a rule, there might be another race to the bot-
tom. The net effect of such a race might be to impair the free flow of
interstate commerce, the classic reason for forming a federation.
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The flip side of externalities is state protectionism that shields lo-
cal interests. Protectionism is usually the worst form of state cheating,
because it strikes at the heart of the freely flowing national market
presumed by federalism. While externalities may obstruct interstate
commerce, protectionist measures directly impede it. Because protec-
tionist measures tend to be easier to spot, they are more likely to trig-
ger retaliatory responses. Barriers to trade, the classic protectionist







C. MECHANISMS TO PRESERVE THE ADVANTAGES OF FEDERALISM
AND TO AMELIORATE THREATS TO THE FEDERAL
ARRANGEMENT
Because of either national or state cheating (or both), most feder-
ations in recent as well as distant history have dissolved, through cen-
tralization of power at the national level (England in the early
nineteenth century) or through federation breakdown by secession or
civil war (Yugoslavia in the 1980s).103 PPT maintains generally that
institutional design can ameliorate-or exacerbate-political dysfunc-
tions. What governmental designs or mechanisms might preserve the
advantages of federalism as well as ameliorating threats to the federal
arrangement?
An obvious answer, attractive to lawyers, is that the Constitution
itself regulates many of the threats we describe. Examples include the
Supremacy Clause,"° which prohibits state shirking and recruits state.
as well as federal judges to enforce that prohibition; the implicit but
unmistakable limitation of the national government to powers enu-
merated in the Constitution,10 5 which is supposed to limit congres-
sional aggrandizement; the Duty Clauses,0 6 which prevent some state
103. See WiLLIM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 49-50
(1964).
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, el. 2.
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2, ci. 2; id. art. III, § 1; id. art. IV, §§ 3,,4; id art. V.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 2, 3.
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protectionism unless Congress consents; and the Direct Taxation
Clause,10 7 which precludes congressional favoritism among the states
in matters of direct taxation. Political scientists are more skeptical of
the general claim, for the protection afforded these specific constitu-
tional directives is dependent upon their being enforceable in a world
where people and institutions behave in self-interested ways. Ameri-
can legal history is filled with examples of apparent constitutional pro-
tections that have been rendered dead letters when overwhelmed by
political forces. These constitutional clauses are not self-enforcing; we
are interested in the institutions that maintain them.
Our approach seeks protections in more systematic mechanisms
of institutional interaction. In this spirit, we hypothesize three differ-
ent kinds of protections: self-enforcing political structures, practical
mechanisms of institutional interdependence, and judicially created
interpretive regimes. We also propose that different protections are
differently applicable to the potential threats to federalism.
1. Self-Enforcing Political Structures
Several features of national political decisionmaking diminish the
problem of congressional cheating on the federal arrangement. The
procedures of lawmaking-constitutionally required bicameral ap-
proval of both chambers in Congress and presentment to the presi-
dent,10 8 together with other procedures adopted by custom-create a
gauntlet which will tend to protect against congressional aggrandize-
ment or burdens on state governments. These procedures constitute a
series of "veto gates"'1 9 through which legislation must pass or, con-
versely, where it may be ambushed. One consequence of these many
veto gates is that a salient interest group harmed by a piece of legisla-
tion will have numerous opportunities to block such legislation, and
sponsors have incentives to purchase their cooperation by including
provisos and exceptions accommodating their needs. State and local
governments are organized into formal lobbying groups inside the
Beltway, and the casually empirical evidence found in the legal litera-
ture tentatively suggests that these groups have at least as much clout
as other groups." 0 Indeed, after Garcia upheld the application of the
107. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl, 4.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
109. See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 80 GEo. LJ. 705 (1992).
110. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 359-72 (1991); Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism?
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FLSA to state employees, Congress at the behest of the states
amended the FLSA to allow the states to provide compensatory time
off rather than higher wages for overtime work."'
Another structural feature of ordinary politics protects against
burdens that systematically discriminate against certain states: the
composition and customs of the Senate."' Each state receives the
same representation (two people) in the Senate, which ensures that
the Senate will not contain many people and that discrimination
against particular states will be rare. Nothing would be more lethal to
a senator's career than the perception that the senator's state was al-
ways a loser in Washington politics. Therefore, a senator will fight
like a wildcat to protect the state against specially targeted harms.
The senator can usually obtain chamber accommodation of the state's
particular interest even when no other state has quite the same inter-
est, by means of logrolling (trading away a vote on issues one does not
care about so strongly), appealing to other members of the senator's
party, and threatening to shut down the chamber with parliamentary
stalls." 3
The power of the president to veto legislation and to influence or
control its implementation also may help protect against discrimina-
tory burdens, especially if those burdens fall on entire regions or upon
a large state. The winner-take-all calculus of the Electoral College
makes the president institutionally leery of alienating an entire state,
and at the very least a first-term president ought to be sensitive to
charges that legislation needlessly hurts a big-vote state or a region.
Note how the Electoral College and the Senate complement one an-
other: The former protects the interests of big states, while the latter
protects the interests of small states." 4
Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW.
301 (1988).
111. FLSA Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (1985).
112. We are not inclined to view the Senate as a major force against aggrandizement, as the
Framers originally planned. See William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM.
Pot. Sci. REv. 452,452-69 (1955); Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amend-
ment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L & PUB. PoL'Y
189 (1987).
113. The best example is Alaska, a small population state with a huge federal land interest.
The Alaskan senators work feverishly to protect their state's interests and are usually successful
even though no other state quite shares their unique interests. Contrast the District of Colum-
bia, a semisovereign entity whose autonomy has been repeatedly bashed and whose laws are
repeatedly overturned by Congress. Usually such initiatives start in the Senate, where the Dis-
trict has no formal or informal representation.
114. Ron Levin suggested this neat point to us.
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The primary and maybe the only self-enforcing structure protect-
ing against state cheating is the existence of a Supreme Court chosen
at the national level and with power to monitor state court implemen-
tation of the Supremacy Clause. As an institution of national power,
the Supreme Court might be expected to enforce national consensus
politics against outlier or shirking states." 5 This mechanism might
have a weakly retarding effect on state shirking, but any such effect
has declined in importance as the number of states has risen arithmeti-
cally and the number of national policies geometrically.
2. Practical Mechanisms of Institutional Interdependence
A more important mechanism for regulating state shirking is a
practical one: conditional federal grants to the states." 6 State budgets
for education, highways, and other fundamental areas depend upon
federal grants. As Dole v. South Dakota"7 held, the Spending Clause
confers upon Congress a great deal of freedom to condition such
money on state compliance with a host of national rules (such as the
fifty-five miles per hour national speed limit in that case). Surely Con-
gress or its agents do not perfectly monitor state compliance with con-
ditional grants, but it would appear likely that potential cutoff of funds
would be a useful motivator for state compliance with national
obligations.
The flip side of state dependence on national grants is central
government reliance on state officials for the administration of their
programs. Political scientists have documented the remarkable extent
to which national programs (especially New Deal ones) depend upon
state administrators for their success."" The constant intercommuni-
cation among national and local administrators and a recognition of
the importance of their good will may help explain why state and local
governments have been politically salient interest groups at the na-
tional level. This phenomenon would provide a practical protection
against congressional burdens on the states. It provides more equivo-
cal protection against aggrandizement or commandeering. On the
115. See Robert A. Dabl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pun. L. 279 (1957). For recent evidence along these lines, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilib-
rium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 26 (1994).
116. See DANIEL ELAzAR, AMERIcAN FEDERAtiSM: A VIEw FROM THE STATEs (3d ed.
1984).
117. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
118. The leading work is MORTON GRODZINS, TiH AMERICAN SYsTEM: A NEW VIEW OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1966), somewhat updated by ELAZAR, supra note 116.
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one hand, the existence of state officials who could help administer
national programs might make Congress more inclined to legislate in
areas of traditional state concern or to commandeer those officials
without pay. On the other hand, Congress could be pressed away
from such actions by federal administrators who were sensitized to the
local perspective or attentive to the need for essential good will at the
state level.
Another practical mechanism protecting against congressional
cheating might be the institution of political parties. Political parties
have served an integrating function in American political history, link-
ing together the lives and interests of local, state, and national party
members.119 These interpersonal as well as politically pragmatic links
might be yet another explanation for the success of state and local
lobbies in limiting direct national burdens on the states, and they
might serve as long-term checks on national aggrandizement and com-
mandeering as well. Most notable legislation is effectively sponsored
by a political party. A party might be reluctant to sponsor national
legislation that ruins its chances to win state and local elections.
3. Judicially Created Interpretive Regimes
The Supreme Court has incentives to protect the federalist ar-
rangement at least some of the time: its legal interest in promoting a
rule of law and its institutional interest in situating itself as an arbiter
of national power dynamics. The Court can accomplish these goals
through the creation of an interpretive regime of rules and guidelines
that both national and state governments can consider ex ante when
they decide whether to cheat on the federal arrangement. An analyti-
cally separate question is how the Court chooses to implement or en-
force such a regime. Possibilities include constitutional rules, clear
119. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L REV. 1567 (1988); Larry Kramer, Understand-
ing Federalism, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1523-42 (1994) (useful survey of the political science
literature). On the importance of parties as federalizing agents, see THE AMERICAN PARTY
SYSTEMS (William Chambers & Walter Dean Burnham eds., 2d ed. 1967); RKER, supra note 103,
at 129-36; CLINTON RossrrEp, PARTIES AND PoLTICS IN AMERICA (1960). Literature refuting
the claim that political parties do not matter includes LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIS IN
THE AMERICAN MOLD (1986); MAuOLM E. JEwEtL & DAVID M. OLSON, AMERICAN STATE
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECIONS (1982); XANDRA KAYDEN & EDDIE MAHE, JR., THE PARTY
GOES ON: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE TwO-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1985); Cor-
nelius P. Cotter & John F. Bibby, Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party
Decline, 95 Pot. Sci. Q. 1 (1980).
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statement rules of statutory interpretation, and articulated but unen-
forced norms. The Court's choice of enforcement depends upon the
institutional advantages and disadvantages of each strategy.
Rules against state shirking, externalities, and protectionism usu-
ally have to be enforced at the national level, and the Court is best
situated to enforce them. Although Congress exists as a remedy for
state cheating of all sorts, the veto gate mechanisms discussed above
make congressional monitoring uneven at best. The same structure
that discourages congressional aggrandizement discourages congres-
sional action against transgressing states. Monitoring such cheating b ,
the Court is easier, since the victims of state cheating will self-identify
(and sue). Constitutional review serves the Court's institutional inter-
ests, because the Court thereby becomes a key agent in the federalist
arrangement; individual Justices or the Court as a whole also will en-
joy an opportunity to give expression to their political values. 20
The Court is not nearly as well situated to regulate congressional
cheating. The structural and practical protections against congres-
sional cheating not only render judicial monitoring less essential, but
also suggest a danger of judicial intervention. If national politics is
operating in the normal way, judicial intervention poses a risk to the
federal arrangement, because the Court might upset a political bal-
ance that accommodates the states. A melodramatic example is Dred
Scott v. Sandford,121 where a proslavery Court invalidated the Mis-
souri Compromise of 1820, which had prohibited the spread of slavery
into lands of the Northwest Territories. While ostensibly enforcing
constitutional limits on congressional power, the Court was unsettling
a statute which had in fact considered and accommodated competing
state interests very carefully. Our theory would lend support to claims
that Dred Scott helped precipitate secession: By discrediting a previ-
ous congressional compromise, the decision destabilized efforts to me-
diate the slavery and antislavery states; by forcing the slavery issue
back to the top of the national agenda, the decision also fractured the
Democratic Party and contributed to the election of Lincoln as
president.
120. The Rehnquist Court, for example, is libertarian on economic issues and cost-conscious
about environmental measures in particular. The Court is cautious in implementing these pref-
erences against Congress but highly activist in implementing these preferences against state and
local governments, especially in dormant commerce clause cases. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 115 (analyzing the 1993 Term).
121. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Another difficulty with Supreme Court protection against con-
gressional cheating is that the Court assumes institutional risks when
it invalidates congressional enactments. In contrast to the states, Con-
gress can hurt the Court institutionally, by refusing to fund judicial
operations (or to increase needed appropriations), by curtailing the
Court's jurisdiction, by holding up Court nominees to litmus tests on
issues Congress cares about, by flooding the federal courts with new
causes of action, and so forth. Hence, the Court is not likely to chal-
lenge national political equilibria very often, and when it does (as in
Dred Scott) the consequences are not likely to be those the Court
desires. On the other hand, because the Justices are appointed by the
president (not Congress) and because the president or either chamber
of Congress can block assaults on the judiciary, the Supreme Court
has considerably more independence than the highest court in a par-
liamentary system. Hence, when there is not a strong presidential-
congressional consensus on an issue of national power, the Court has
considerable leeway to exercise a truly independent judgment.'22
III. WHAT OUR THEORY HAS TO SAY ABOUT THE
SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM DECISIONS
The understanding of federalism we have outlined is only a the-
ory, and one that has not been tested. 123 Still, our approach offers
several advantages for legal analysts. It is a better normative pitch
today than a libertarian theory of "double security" (for reasons dis-
cussed in Part II), but it has at least as powerful a connection with the
122. This phenomenon is revealed most dramatically in separation of powers or other struc-
tural cases which pit the president against Congress. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(finding independent counsel constitutional); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding
Gramm-Rudman enforcement provision unconstitutional); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(finding legislative veto unconstitutional).
123. In a separate paper, we have collaborated with a coauthor to set forth a comparativist
case for such a theory. See Bednar et al., Political Theory, supra note 6. We compare the experi-
ence of American federalism with that of England between 1700 and 1832 and of Canada after
1867 and argue that federalism arrangements are unstable unless protected by a regime of sepa-
rate powers or a genuinely independent judiciary. Lacking a regime of separate powers, Canada
was able to sustain a robust federalism until 1949 because both parliamentary and provincial
decisions were reviewed by the Privy Council in London, a court of last resort independent of
Canadian national or provincial politics. K.M. Lysyk, Reshaping Canadian Federalism, 13 U.
BrT. CoLuM. L. Rnv. 1 (1979). After 1949, when Privy Council review ended and the Canadian
Supreme Court became the court of last resort, effective review of parliamentary statutes effec-
tively ended. P.W. Hogg, Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases?, 57
CANADIAN B. REv. 721, 727, 729 (1979). The termination of independent judicial review, in the
context of no separation of powers, has contributed to separatist movements (which would be
important in any event because of ethnic and linguistic divisions in Canada).
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Framers' understanding about why federalism is a useful arrangement
and how its advantages are to be preserved against cheating. The fed-
eralists sold the Constitution as a liberty-protecting social contract,
but they also sold it as an arrangement that would assure vigorous,
energetic (their term), and efficient (our term) government.12 4 The
explication in Part II reveals how rational choice thinkers (which the
Framers were) could believe this. The Framers also expected federal-
ism to be effectuated through a combination of institutional structur-
ing, practical politics, and judicial review-but they provided very
little elaboration about how these different mechanisms were sup-
posed to work in 1789 and, of course, no elaboration about how they
are supposed to work today. Our theory provides a plausible, and we
hope persuasive, account of how these different mechanisms might
operate.
A further advantage of our model (for lawyers) is that it provides
a normative theory that might sustain doctrinal innovation beyond the
text and original intent of the Constitution. This is a path the Court
chose long ago. Once the choice of an alternate path has been made,
it is better to follow a good rather than a bad path. In the legal realist
tradition, our theory assumes that political function is more important
than analytical form in constitutional cases and seeks functionally pro-
ductive doctrines. In the legal process tradition, our theory suggests
that a functional approach can nonetheless subserve rule of law values
if it induces stable and productive institutional interactions. In that
spirit, this part will revisit the constitutional quandaries raised in Part
I, and apply the analysis of Part II to rationalize some apparent
inconsistencies.
A. Tim PEREz-BAss-LOPEZ LINE OF CASES
We are strongly attracted to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in
Lopez. As a matter of law, it is most faithful to the Court's twentieth
century precedents (Justice Thomas' concurring opinion is most con-
sistent with the nineteenth century precedents, however). As a matter
of policy, it makes a detailed case for the proposition that schoolyard
guns are a national crisis demanding national solutions. The dissent
also shows that Congress was aware of and responding to such a na-
tional crisis when it passed the law. As a matter of political theory,
Justice Breyer recognizes that the Court should play a secondary role
124. See DAVID F. EPSnmm, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984) (discuss-
ing the political theory and rational choice assumptions in Trm FEDERALIST).
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in monitoring jurisdictional limits on Congress' authority and should
defer to congressional judgments where they are reasonably
grounded.
Complementing Justice Breyer's argument, our theory maintains
that other mechanisms work better than judicial review to protect
against congressional overreaching. Structural limits on congressional
power (bicameralism and presentment) provide many veto points
where local interests can be considered.'25 More important, local in-
terests have compelling means of signaling their opposition if a propo-
sal overreaches. Opposition by either national political party would
doom most measures, and practical cooperation by local officials is
necessary for their effective operation.126 Finally, the Supreme Court
can narrowly construe statutes that venture beyond the constitutional
periphery, as it did in Bass.127
On the other hand, a danger that our theory recognizes is that the
Court's overall pre-Lopez record might have been too deferential to
national political processes, allowing Congress and the states to be-
lieve that there are, effectively, no limits on congressional authority to
regulate local matters. This is the belief that the Court's post-New
Deal case law had engendered, fanned by academic commentary dis-
missing the Commerce Clause as entirely toothless. Lopez, in fact,
illustrates that phenomenon. The federal law was enacted without the
detailed factual findings such as those in Perez," and without any
reference in the prohibitory language to an interstate commerce nexus
such as that in Bass. There is probably some relationship between the
perception that there are no effective limits on Congress' power, and
Congress behaving as though its power is unlimited.
Like Congress, the states have inferred from prior cases that
there are no limits on congressional jurisdiction. It is unclear precisely
what effect this has on the states, but it may threaten their willingness
125. These veto points do not guarantee such arguments will prevail, of course. President
Bush expressed federalism concerns about the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 but still
signed the law, probably because of the strong support it enjoyed in Congress.
126. For example, the FBI was not expected to enforce the schoolyard gun law. The defend-
ant in Lopez was apprehended by school officials and then processed by local law enforcement
officers. Only after local charges were filed was the defendant charged with a federal offense.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
127. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
128. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Congress added some findings-after the
"fact"-in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125.
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to adopt aggressive and innovative local regulations. 129 A perception
of limitless congressional power could be expected to dampen the
states' enthusiasm for the federal arrangement. The Canadian experi-
ence is a tentative parallel. Before 1949, the Privy Council in London
enforced jurisdictional limitations on the Canadian Parliament at the
behest of the provinces. After 1949, the Privy Council was gradually
divested of this power, leaving the Canadian Supreme Court as the
only judicial monitor. As a coordinate rather than superior branch,
the Supreme Court rarely invalidated national legislation. Some com-
mentators think this dearth of judicial monitoring has contributed to,
the increased provincial dissatisfaction with Canada's federal
arrangement. 30
Lopez is the Court's reminder to the states, Congress, and the
Court itself that the jurisdictional limits on congressional authority are
too textually tangible and politically important to leave completely
unattended by the judiciary. On the other hand, Lopez is no declara-
tion that the Court is prepared to stop a wide range of congressional
initiatives, as it did (to disastrous effect) in the 1930s. The decision's
curious focus on the absence of statutory language and of congres-
sional findings of an interstate commercial nexus can be read as a "re-
mand" to Congress, which can probably enact a more carefully crafted
statutory scheme. As a remand to the legislature, Lopez then be-
comes more like Bass and (in the Tenth Amendment context)
Gregory.
In short, Lopez does not and should not augur a new period of
aggressive judicial enforcement of jurisdictional limitations on con-
gressional power. It is best read as a remand for Congress to attend to
federalism values more explicitly. It was a constitutional wake-up call.
B. THE GARCIA-GREGORY-NEW YORK LINE OF CASES
Our theory provides a way of understanding Garcia13 ' and recon-
ciling it with the Court's other precedents. Garcia has, justifiably,
taken an academic beating for arguing that the formal representation
of the states in the Senate and the Electoral College and their ostensi-
ble control over House redistricting assure that states qua states will
129. In Lopez, the state dismissed charges against the defendant after the federal criminal
charges were filed. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
130. See supra note 123.
131. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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be adequately protected by the ordinary political process. 32 Our the-
ory considers Garcia defensible for different reasons. To begin with,
ordinary burdens on the states, especially those borne equally by the
states and by private concerns, are not as threatening to the federal
arrangement as are congressional aggrandizement at the expense of
traditional state regulations, burdens that discriminate among states
or regions, and national commandeering of state resources to carry
out national programs. To the extent such burdens do undermine the
federal arrangement, the states seem well equipped to avoid "exces-
sive" burdens, not because states can threaten Congress or the presi-
dent through the powers ascribed to them in Garcia, but instead
because the states are a well-organized lobbying group, with unusually
good clout because of their importance in national political parties
and (often) in administration as well. For similar reasons, our theory
supports the Court's decision in Union Gas to allow congressional ab-
rogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The attacks on Garcia as the "second death of federalism" seem
overblown, especially in light of New York. Some commentators have
assumed that New York narrows or implicitly overrules Garcia,33 and
a dedicated legal realist might speculate that Union Gas and South
Carolina are also at risk of being overruled or somehow narrowed.
134
To the contrary, New York is not inconsistent with these decisions.
Ironically, New York is hardest to explain along the republican lines
left open in Garcia and South Carolina, where the Court said that ju-
dicial review might be appropriate if the states' interests were not in
132. See A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia: Of Federalism and Constitutional Values, 16 PUBLIus 17
(1986); John C. Pittenger, Garcia and the Political Safeguards of Federalism: Is There a Better
Solution to the Conundrum of the Tenth Amendment?, 22 PuBiuus 1, 2-10 (1992); Van Alstyne,
supra note 41. Even defenders of Garcia dissent from the Court's political analysis. See Martha
A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided
Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. Rnv. 84, 110 (1985).
133. E.g., Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASrNGs CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994); Martin H.
Redish, Doing It With Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on
Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HAsT-nGs CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994).
134. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505 (1988). Four of the five Justices in the Union Gas majority have left the Court; two (Bren-
nan and Marshall) have been replaced with more conservative Justices (Souter and Thomas).
All of the Union Gas dissenters are still on the Court, and all joined Justice O'Connor's opinion
in New York and Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Lopez.
Although South Carolina was a more lopsided decision (only Justice O'Connor dissented),
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia expressed disagreement with parts of Justice Bren-
nan's opinion. Four of the six Justices who joined the Brennan opinion (including Brennan)
have left the Court.
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fact represented in the national political process. This process-based
loophole was not available to the Court in New York, for the radioac-
tive waste law's take-title provisions were part of an elaborate bar-
gaining process in which the states fully participated and in which New
York's representatives were most active.'3
The best way to reconcile New York with Garcia is to focus on the
different degrees of threat that simple burdens and commandeering
pose to the federal arrangement. Commandeering poses a threat to
federalism for one reason state burdens do: States lose decisionmak-
ing flexibility and may have fewer resources to devote to their basic
police and developmental policies. Commandeering poses additional
threats not posed by simple burdens, however: It blurs lines of polit-
ical accountability and enables the national government to follow inef-
ficient policies for which it does not pay.136 Perhaps most important,
commandeering represents a disrespect for state autonomy that might
be more likely to undermine the states' overall enthusiasm for the fed-
eral arrangement.
Under our theory, Gregory137 can be viewed as reconciling the
judicial deference found in Garcia-South Carolina-Union Gas with
whatever threats to federalism are posed by congressional burdens on
135. This point is emphasized in Justice White's New York dissent, New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 194-99 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
conceded in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. Id. at 180-81 (opinion of the Court). New
York seems to have benefitted from a bait-and-switch tactic, by which it obtained some benefits
from the statute, at the price of the take-title provisions which it was able to nullify.
Justice O'Connor justified the bait-and-switch by arguing that federalism is of value not
because it protects the states but because it provides a double security for personal liberty. Id. at
181-82. Her enthusiasm for the libertarian theory of federalism here is in contrast to her luke-
warm statement of it in Gregory, and is impossible to reconcile with her and the Court's curtail-
ment of federal habeas corpus review in the name of federalism. Ironically, Justice O'Connor
supported the libertarian theory of federalism with a reference and quote from Justice Black-
mun's dissent in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
New York, 505 U.S. at 181. Justice Blackmun's dissent was an impassioned libertarian objection
to an O'Connor opinion that, in the name of federalism, refused to allow an apparently innocent
man to challenge his death sentence in federal court, on the ground that his lawyers had missed
an obscure (and unpublished) state court filing deadline. Mr. Coleman was subsequently
executed.
136. See generally FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 783-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that the challenged provisions were within Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National
Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv.
577, 636-39, 657 (1986) (providing a more extensive analysis of the particularly acute problems
posed by commandeering).
137. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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the states qua states. If these threats are not great dangers to the fed-
eral arrangement, and structural and practical mechanisms protect
against their being realized very often, these particular threats need
not be policed by constitutional judicial review. Because of the vul-
nerability of the Court to national political pressures, any such review
would predictably have little bite. Nonetheless, both procedural and
substantive federalism values would be served by some judicial role.
These various concerns can all be satisfied by the interpretive regime
of super-strong clear statement rules the Court has created in Greg-
ory, Atascadero, and other cases: Congress can burden the states with
rules and liabilities, but only if those burdens are explicitly laid out on
the face of the statute.138 Burdens such as these will not be inferred
from general language or broad statutory purposes (Atascadero), and
those burdens that are created on the face of these statutes will not be
liberally applied (Gregory).
By protecting against state burdens by means of super-strong
clear statement rules rather than constitutional invalidation, the Court
makes it harder or more expensive for Congress to enact legislation
burdening the states directly. This would itself provide some protec-
tion for the states, since ambiguous statutes will be interpreted in their
favor (Gregory). A clear statement approach rather than a constitu-
tional approach to state burdens is also one with fewer political risks
for the Court, because Congress can assert its preferences by overrid-
ing the Court with the requisite clear statement (as it did in response
to Atascadero). Even when Congress does override the Court, the
federalist arrangement might be somewhat strengthened, because the
values of federalism -might become a specific focus of congressional
attention. As Justice O'Connor said in Gregory, "inasmuch as this
Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protec-
tion of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended
such an exercise."'
39
C. THE PHILADELPHiA-KASSEL-CARBONE LINE OF CASES
Our theory provides a normative justification for at least some
judicial monitoring of state protectionism (City of Philadelphia) and
138. Gregory, 501 U.S. 452; Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
139. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464; see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERIucAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-
25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988) (quoted in Gregory).
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externalities (Kassel). 40 Thus, we endorse the activism entailed in the
Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Correspondingly,
we reject the suggestion of several commentators that the Court aban-
don its dormant commerce clause jurisprudence and focus instead on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.141 That provision has the ad-
vantage of being in the Constitution, but is too narrow a protection
against state cheating, as it has been interpreted. 42 The Privileges
and Immunities Clause has been construed to protect only against
state rules affecting fundamental rights (such as the right to practice a
profession) and distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens of
states. Without major rethinking, privileges and immunities jurispru-
dence would not be up to the task of displacing the dormant com-
merce clause as the doctrinal basis for the Court's regulation of state
protectionism and externalities.
Our theory does, however, pose the following challenge to the
Court's activist regulation of state protectionism and externalities,
whatever the doctrinal basis: Should such monitoring be left to the
national political process (Congress), and the role of the Court limited
to a perhaps more expansive preemption analysis? In other words,
should the Supremacy Clause (another explicit provision in the Con-
stitution) be the primary basis for monitoring all sorts of state cheat-
ing-from shirking, which is now regulated mainly under the
Supremacy Clause, to externalities and protectionism, which are now
regulated primarily under the dormant commerce clause? Congress
can correct state regulations that impose significant externalities on
other states, such as the truck-length regulation in Kassel. Having lost
in the Iowa political process (because the governor vetoed a truck-
length bill), trucking interests could have turned to Congress rather
than the Court for relief. Congress has strong incentives to be respon-
sive to petitions supported by such a powerful group, and it is doubtful
that Iowa could have blocked efforts to resolve the truck-length prob-
lem through national legislation. It is telling that, even after the Court
invalidated the Iowa limitation in Kassel, Congress enacted a series of
statutes that dealt with the problem. 43 Not only could Congress deal
140. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
141. See sources in note 63 supra.
142. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988); Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985); United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. City of
Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
143. The Surface Transportation Act of 1982 eliminated state restrictions on double-axle
trucks on interstate highways. 49 U.S.C. § 2301, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379
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with this problem more effectively than could the Court, but the exist-
ence of activist judicial review funnels these political disputes into the
federal courts and possibly discourages Congress from taking greater
responsibility for monitoring state externalities especially.
On the other hand, the structural mechanisms that are supposed
to protect state and local regulation against congressional interference
generally might also protect protectionist states against congressional
reprimand. Because New Jersey was just as well represented in the
congressional process as the city of Philadelphia, for example, Con-
gress was not likely to offer an effective remedy against the former's
protectionist legislation. Contrast Kassel, where national trucking in-
terests and a variety of states were arrayed against Iowa's interests.
Kassel was also a case where the effects on interstate commerce were
substantial. Congressional monitoring would not be as reliable where
a single local policy has modest effects, as in Carbone."' This is the
sort of regulation that would not trigger much congressional attention
but is well suited for case-by-case adjudication.
Our theory is critical of the views of some Justices that the dor-
mant commerce clause should be limited to cases of open and formal
"discrimination" against interstate commerce. If the dormant com-
merce clause were so limited, it would cease to be an effective monitor
against interstate externalities. Conversely, our theory is equally criti-
cal of the view that the Court should strike down any and every in-
stance of interstate discrimination. For example, we are concerned
that Carbone (and perhaps City of Philadelphia) presents Gregory
concerns: Is the United States (here the Court rather than Congress)
being sufficiently sensitive to local policies that are not protectionist?
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Carbone set forth a hard test for the mu-
nicipality to pass: "Discrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow
class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigor-
ous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest . *. .. "I' Justice Kennedy required the town to make "the
clearest showing that the unobstructed flow of interstate commerce
itself is unable to solve the local problem."' 6 Stated this way, is it any
(1994). Before that part of the statute could take effect, Congress in 1984 authorized the Secre-
tary of Transportation to prohibit double-axle trucks from portions of the interstate highway
system on the basis of traffic safety and at the petition of state governors.
144. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. CL 1677 (1994).
145. Id. at 1683.
146. Id.
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surprise that Clarkstown lost the case? Our theory of federalism sug-
gests that the Court should not fetishize the free national market and
should approach the cases with a more lenient eye toward state and
local police and developmental policies.
147
CONCLUSION
The theories we have examined in this paper-libertarian theory,
republican theory, and positive political theory-are procedural theo-
ries of federalism. That is, they depend upon the premise that the
structure and procedures of government can add to or detract from
the polity's well-being. It has been suggested to us by several com-
mentators that a robust theory of federalism must be substantive as
well as procedural. According to this view, Lopez should be criticized
for insensitivity to the national crisis of guns in the schoolyard; New
York for interfering with a good scheme for disposing of dangerous
radioactive waste; and Carbone for discouraging local efforts to deal
creatively with waste disposal. Overall, the Court's recent decisions
have a decidedly libertarian slant reminiscent of the Lochner-era bias
that was repudiated by the New Deal.148
Although this Article does not set forth a substantive theory, it
invites such theories. Thus, Carbone, a decision we criticize on proce-
dural grounds, might and should also be criticized on substantive envi-
ronmental grounds. The two criticisms can be complements: The town
of Clarkstown ought to have the flexibility to experiment with differ-
ent forms of environmental regulation, and the form it has chosen is
appropriate. Moreover, our analysis suggests the following dilemma
for any theory of federalism. An advantage of federalism is that most
regulation and government service are provided at the local level, but
for race-to-the-bottom issues, the national level is the best place for
regulation. What we do not address is, What is the "bottom"? Envi-
ronmental issues often pose race-to-the-bottom problems, often defin-
ing the "bottom" as very little protection for the environment. Also,
national regulation is not a desirable solution to environmental race-
to-the-bottom issues if such regulation distributes power and re-
sources in normatively undesirable ways. National environmental reg-
ulation might suffer from this flaw, as might local regulation (recall
147. This teaching would not necessarily require a different result in Carbone, though we are
persuaded by Justice Souter's excellent dissent. k at 1692-1702. Justice O'Connor's opinion
concurring in the judgment is consistent with our recommendation as well. Id. at 1687-92.
148. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1652-55 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey).14 9 Conversely, local regulation of
traditional local functions might not be desirable if localities are politi-
cally ossified.
Ought the bow to substance overwhelm any procedural theory,
including ours? Descriptively, it seems to us that the overall jurisdic-
tional contours of federalism are unaffected by substantive judgments,
which at best operate at the margins. And even at the margins, we are
not persuaded that substance overwhelms process. The pivotal Jus-
tices have repeatedly submerged their immediate substantive prefer-
ences to serve longer-term procedural values. This seems particularly
true of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor (no fans of guns) in Lopez,
Justice Blackmun (who changed his mind) in Garcia, and environmen-
tally friendly Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in Carbone. It strikes us
as unlikely that the Justices are more tolerant of guns in the school-
yard (Lopez) than they are of loan-sharking (Perez), or that they view
radioactive waste (New York) as less pressing than the wages and
hours of government employees (Garcia).
Prescriptively, a substance-driven theory of federalism strikes us
as one that too quickly gives up on rule of law values and undermines
the potential advantages of federalism. If the rules of constitutional
jurisdiction are supposed to depend primarily on the Court's judgment
about often controversial substantive issues, they will be much harder
to predict in advance, and impossible to figure over the medium or
long term. The commitment problem we describe would be exacer-
bated rather than ameliorated by the Court, and exploitive cheating
could be expected to increase. If anything, we should recommend the
Court follow an "anti-substance" strategy: To improve its own credi-
bility, the Court should frequently note its disdain for statutory
schemes it is validating, and should occasionally strike down a good
scheme if it contravenes a constitutional boundary the Court is
charged with maintaining. It is in this manner that the Court is best
able to preserve the long-term health of the federal union.
149. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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